

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

## Memorandum by the Secretary


Pursuant to a request by the Director of Central Intelligence the enclosed memorandum is circulated herewith for consideration of the Intelligence Advisory Board at its next meeting.

Secretary, N.I.A,

S1016/Keefs/JU/87-230

I.A.B. 3/1

HS/HC- 280



## EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVE OFFICERS AS AGENTS

Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence

- 1. The ICAPS study made in pursuance of the request by the Acting Chief of Naval Intelligence on the problem of employment of reserve officers as agents has been completed.
- 2. It has been established that in at least one case a naval reserve officer residing abroad was hired as an agent by the representative of a Federal Intelligence agency other than the office of Naval Intelligence.
- 3. Paragraph 4 a of N.I.A. Directive No. 5 assigns to the CIG "conduct of all organized Federal espionage and counter-espionage operations. . . ." Apparently the employment of agents by Government activities other than the CIG has been sanctioned on the grounds that it was of a casual nature as opposed to CIG's organized activity in this field. Such undertakings are uncoordinated and lead not only to confusion and wasted effort and controvert the purpose of the above-cited paragraph, but, as in the case of military and naval reserve officers employed as agents, also jeopardize the best interest of the War and Navy Departments.
- 4. It is considered that the employment of agents, whether they be in a military or naval or civilian status for espionage and counter-espionage operations by any Government activity or its representatives, runs counter to the intent of the above-quoted provision of N.I.A. Directive No. 5.
- 5. However, the use of the services of reserve military and neval personnel in a civilian capacity abroad as observers and reporters by their parent department for the collection of intelligence information can not be construed to classify them as agents for espionage and counter-espionage operations. Consequently, this practice must be considered as a purely departmental undertaking unrelated to the special operations of CIG but all

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ENCLOSURE





reserve personnel of the Armed Services residing abroad in civilian capacity should be used as observers and reporters of intelligence information only by their respective departments.

6. Further, in order to avoid the dangers set forth in paragraph 3 above, each of the IAB agencies should take positive steps to insure the coordination of the activities of such reserve personnel in accordance with the provisions of N.I.A., Directive No. 7.

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ENCLOSURE

